改革开放20多年来，中国中小企业取得了长足的发展，对国民经济的作用越来越不容忽视，可以说，没有中小企业的发展，中国经济就不可能取得真正的大发展。下面是小编带来的中小企业融资英文文章，欢迎阅读!

中小企业融资英文文章篇一

中国中小企业融资新招

Reports from China suggest that this technique is beginning to catch on among cash-strapped small and medium enterprises.

来自中国的报道显示，这种手法在资金匮乏的中小企业当中很有市常

According to the South China Morning Post, three such companies in Jiangsu province – Changzhou Shende Seamless Tube, Changzhou Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Group, and TingVoa.com Chang Group – have clubbed together to issue Rmb260m in joint three-year debt.

据《南华早报》(SCMP)报道，中国江苏省的三家公司采用了这种方法：常州盛德无缝钢管有限公司、常州东风农机集团有限公司和新华昌集团有限公司。这三家公司将发行2.6亿元人民币的3年期集合债券。

The three have credit ratings of triple B, triple B plus and A minus, respectively. But, due to support from the local government, their jointly issued bonds are triple A rated. So, is the dreaded collateralised debt obligation, that clever sleight of hand that helped drive the US housing market into the stratosphere, creeping into China?

这三家公司的信用评级分别为BBB、BBB+和A-。但由于得到当地政府的支持，它们所发行集合债券的评级被定为AAA级。这么说，令人畏惧的债务抵押债券(Collateralised Debt Obligations, CDO)——将美国住房市场推上“巅峰”的聪明技巧——正在潜入中国吗?

There’s a key difference to the US practice of bundling subprime mortgages and repackaging them: these Chinese bonds are backed by the government, albeit the local kind. So the question for investors isn’t whether the individual companies are triple A rated, it’s whether they think the local government will pay back the debt on their behalf if things go wrong.

但这一做法与美国将一些次级抵押贷款打包并重新包装有一个关键的不同之处：这些集合债券得到了政府的支持，尽管只是地方政府。所以，投资者应关注的问题不是每家公司是否拥有AAA评级，而是一旦形成坏账，当地政府是否会替发行人偿还债务。

Local governments are not without their own debt worries. Last year the national audit office put the LG debt figure at about $1,650bn, while others think it could be much higher.

地方政府在债务方面也有自己的担忧。中国国家审计署(National Audit Office)去年公布的数据显示，地方政府的负债额约为1.65万亿美元，而其他人则认为，实际负债额可能远远高于这个数字。

So would bond investors lending to SMEs, and in turn local governments, be throwing good money after bad? That depends on your view of China’s debt chain. Local governments largely owe money to big state-backed banks, which in turn are tools of the central government.

如此说来，债券投资者借钱给中小企业、进而借钱给地方政府，这是在没完没了地把钱往水里扔吗?这要取决于你如何看待中国的债务链。地方政府的主要债权人是大型国有银行，而国有银行又是中央政府的政策工具。

Many economists believe China’s banks will need some kind of recapitalisation as bad debts surface and non-performing loans rise. If managed correctly, that needn’t be a cause for alarm. At the moment, things don’t look too troubling. NPL ratios are low, and indeed falling.

许多经济学家都认为，随着坏账浮出水面以及不良贷款的增加，中国的银行需要进行某种形式的资本重组。如果处理得当，这无需成为拉响警报的理由。当前，情况看上去并没有那么糟糕。不良贷款率较低，实际上正在下降。

China’s SMEs need cash to keep going – they’ve been frozen out of normal credit channels for months. This method of funding helps spread the credit risks to investors, with a government backstop. So, economically, it is good news. And so long as China’s debt problem looks manageable, there’s no reason to believe that these triple A rated bonds are any different to any others. Investors got their cash back following a “credit event” on a similar bond this year.

中国的中小企业需要现金才能维持运转，但它们被冻结在正常信贷渠道之外已有几个月了。这种融资方式相当于是在政府的支持下，将信贷风险分散给投资者。因此，从经济意义上说，这是一个好消息。只要中国的债务问题看起来仍然可控，我们就没有理由认为这些AAA级债券与其他AAA级债券之间存在任何差别。今年，一种类似的债券发生了“信贷事件”，不过后来，投资者还是拿回了自己的资金。

But – with China’s economy slowing, and its debt problem essentially impossible to quantify – it may still require a strong stomach to invest.

但是，随着中国经济增长放缓，加上其债务问题基本上无法量化，因此，要想继续投资，可能还需要有一颗强大的内心。

中小企业融资英文文章篇二

中国中小企业融资难的出路

The Fix for China's Small-Business Cash Crunch

Beijing is worried about the country's shadow banking market and the risks it poses to the financial system. The central bank's recent liberalization of regulations on bank lending rates was in part an attempt to address the fact that a large proportion of the economy's financing activity happens in this grey or black market. Yet policy makers will have to go further if they want to address this growing threat to the country's economic stability.

中国政府担心中国的影子银行市场以及它给金融系统造成的风险。中国央行不久前放松对银行放贷利率的监管在一定程度上是试图应对一个事实，即中国经济中的融资活动有很大一部分发生在这个灰色或黑色市场。然而，决策者如果想应对中国经济稳定所面对的这一越来越大的威胁，则必须更进一步。

Shadow banking refers to illegal and unregulated lending practices through financing companies, trusts, street-side lenders or the like instead of through banks. This is mainly a phenomenon involving small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for 80% of China's jobs and 60% of its GDP and yet struggle to secure bank loans. A recent study commissioned by the State Council estimates that 62% of China's small and micro businesses have no lending relationships at all with banks.

影子银行业指的是不通过银行，而是通过融资公司、信托机构、民间贷款商等机构进行非法及不受监管的放贷活动。这种现象主要牵涉到中小企业，这些企业为中国创造了80%的就业机会，并贡献了60%的GDP，然而却难以获得银行贷款。中国国务院不久前委托进行的一项研究估计，62%的中国小微企业与银行完全没有贷款关系。

When small companies can't borrow from banks, they borrow elsewhere, at much higher cost. Beijing understands this, and has tried to boost bank lending to small companies. But officials have not yet been able to overcome many of the incentives that contribute to banks' reluctance to do so. Loans to small businesses tend to be, well, small, and loan officers shy away from making them for the simple reason that it increases their workload. Why bust a gut making 10 loans when you can make one large one, particularly if it is to a state-owned enterprise with implicit government support?

当小公司无法从银行贷款时，就只能另寻他途，而且要付出高得多的代价。中国政府明白这一点，并尝试增加银行向小企业提供的贷款。但官员们迄今一直未能克服促使银行不愿意向小企业放贷的众多因素。向小企业发放的贷款规模往往较小，贷款官员避免发放这类贷款只是出于一个简单的原因：他们的工作量会增加。要是你能发放一笔大额的贷款，干嘛还要费劲巴拉地去发放10笔小额贷款呢，尤其是如果那笔大额贷款是发放给得到政府暗中支持的国有企业的话。

Last month, in an effort to get banks to lower their lending rates and boost lending generally, the central bank removed its floor on lending rates. But the practical effect, if any, will largely be to reduce the borrowing costs of state-owned enterprises. It won't lead to an increase in bank lending to SMEs or reduce their reliance on the shadow banking system, because it doesn't change the basic incentives for banks.

上个月，为了让银行降低贷款利率并在整体上增加放贷，中国央行取消了贷款利率下限。但这一举措即便产生了实际效果，也只是降低了国有企业的贷款成本。此举并不会导致向中小企业发放的贷款增加，或是降低中小企业对于影子银行系统的依赖，因为它并没有改变影响银行放贷行为的因素。

Authorities were much closer to the mark when, in 2009, they allowed the creation of small loan companies, or SLCs. These are privately funded entities that make quick loans to small businesses as an alternative to traditional bank loans. They are not regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) but they are overseen by provincial financial officials and follow government-approved lending standards.

当局在2009年时曾经更接近这个目标，当时他们允许建立小额贷款公司。这些公司是私人注资的实体，向小企业发放快速贷款，作为传统银行贷款的替代选择。这些小贷公司不受中国银行业监督管理委员会的监管，而是由省级金融官员主管，并遵循政府批准的放贷标准。

These loan companies are proving to be a good funding alternative for SMEs. From my research and discussions with loan-company owners, their loans are collateralized and demand is strong, and as long as they adhere to strict loan to value ratio rules, defaults are rare.

这些贷款公司成为很好的中小企业融资替代选择。笔者进行的研究以及与贷款公司老板的访谈显示，这些公司的贷款都有抵押，需求很旺，而且只要他们坚持严格的贷款与价值比率规则，就很少有违约的情况。

However, current regulations limit the amounts SLCs can lend. Changes are needed for the program to make a serious dent in the funding shortfall the SME sector faces.

然而，目前的监管规定令小额贷款公司的贷款规模受到限制。要想显著缓解中小企业面临的融资难问题，这个方案还需要进行一些调整。

The first problem is that there are not enough small-loan companies. Beijing has ceased issuing new licences, effectively capping the number of SLCs. Since these tend to be smaller firms, the numerical cap also serves as a cap on available credit. This made sense when the program was in its pilot stage. But authorities should now feel confident expanding it.

首先，小贷公司的数量还不够。中国政府已停发新牌照，实际上就是给小贷公司数量设限了。由于这些公司都是规模较小的公司，数量上的限制也就意味着贷款规模的限制。这样做在试点阶段是讲得通的。但现在相关部门应该有扩大这个试点的信心了。

Second, restrictions on capital-raising leave small-loan companies without enough cash to meet demand for loans. The lending ceiling is the amount of a loan company's registered capital, plus borrowings from banks of up to 50% of equity. A loan company with equity of $20 million has its lending capped at $30 million, and the only way it can increase this cap is to raise more equity.

其次，对融资规模的限制规定令小贷公司没有足够的资金来满足贷款需求。小贷公司放贷上限是其注册资本加上从银行获得的不超过其股本50%的融资。一家股本为2,000万美元的小贷公司贷款上限就是3,000万美元，而提高这个上限的唯一办法就是扩大股本。

As most SLCs face the same difficulties obtaining loans from banks as other small businesses, they end up lending only the capital put into them by their owners, which is not nearly sufficient to meet demand. Small-loan companies' collective lending is estimated at only 600 billion yuan ($98 billion) while the CBRC estimates a 2.67 trillion yuan gap between SME demand for loans and the supply. Loan-company owners are reluctant to pour too much capital into their firms because the process of adding equity capital is tied up with red tape, making it hard to make withdrawals later.

由于大多数小贷公司像其他小企业一样难以从银行获得贷款，因此他们只能用所有者注入的资本来放贷，这远不够满足目前的需求。小贷公司总体放贷能力估计仅有人民币6,000亿元，而银监会估计中小企业贷款缺口为人民币2.67万亿元。小贷公司所有者不愿向其公司注入太多资本，因为增加股本的程序繁琐，以后抽回资本有相当难度。

Beijing could allow small loan companies to borrow funds from their shareholders. Regulators have been justifiably cautious about this, since it would open the door to potentially large and rapid flows of capital into and out of loan companies, with destabilizing consequences for the broader industry.

中国政府可以允许小贷公司向股东融资。监管部门在这方面颇为审慎，这是可以理解的，因为这会打开资金大规模快速进出这些贷款公司的大门，可能导致整个行业出现不稳定。

But the answer to that fear should be carefully tailored regulation, not a stifling of the industry. For instance, Beijing could cap shareholder loans at an amount equal to total invested equity. This would allow small-loan company executives the flexibility to put more capital into their firms via shareholder loans, but keep them from overextending themselves.

但要想解决这种担忧，应当审慎制定监管规定，而不是扼杀整个行业。比如，政府可以将股东提供的融资规模限制在与其总股本投资规模相等的水平。这样既可以让小贷公司管理层以股东贷款的方式向公司注入更多资本，又能使其不至于过度扩张。

The shadow banking issue illustrates the extent of the challenges Beijing will face in reforming the financial system. But these challenges are not insurmountable. In cases such as small-loan companies, Beijing already has the tools it needs. As reform continues, authorities should look for opportunities to expand programs that already are working even as they undertake new liberalizations in other areas.

影子银行问题显示出中国政府在金融系统改革方面将面临多大程度的挑战。但这些挑战并不是不能克服的。在小贷公司等问题上，北京需要的解决工具已经有了。随着改革继续深入，相关部门在其他领域实施新的开放措施的同时，也应当寻找扩大已经开始发挥作用的试点的机会。

相关文章拓展阅读：小企业的衰落

During the recent years, countless small businesses have closed their doors and gone bankrupt. The corner grocer's , the small dress shop, the beauty salon, all are victims of market competition. Most of them are replaced by other small businesses that temporarily fill the needs of the neighbourhood but frequently end up, sharing the same fate of dissolution. More often, the market served by small businesses is taken over by large stores and shops. Businesses like the corner groceries and the dress shops have gone to big department stores and supermarkets, which not only keep adequate store and variety, but also provide better environment and service.

Apparently, it is increasingly difficult for small businesses to succeed in the present complex economic structure based, as it is, on small profit margins and tremendous sales volume. Lack of enough fund and poor management may be the chief cause of this tragedy. In addition, the quality of their commodities often causes suspicion of the customers as many small businesses are found to sell fake products for more profit, thus earning themselves an evil reputation. As to shopping environment and convenient service, they are unmentionable. All of the above speed up their bankruptcy.

Today, with the establishment of more and more groups and big corporations, how small businesses can survive in the tide of the market competitive economy hasbecome a hot social issue.